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W

hen describing the proceedings at the U.S. Supreme Court on March 18,
1963, the day the Court read its opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright, Anthony
Lewis wrote in Gideon’s Trumpet:

A fourth state criminal case came from California, and Justice Douglas for a
six-three majority said poor prisoners were entitled to free counsel for their
appeals. To any informed listener it was obvious that this same rule must
apply at trials and that Betts v. Brady was about to be overruled.1
The case that Lewis described is Douglas v. California.2 The Court in that case held
under Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection that indigent criminal convicts were entitled to counsel on their first appeal as of right. As between the
two right-to-counsel cases handed down that day, Douglas was at least arguably the
more pioneering case at the time. Yale Kamisar and Jesse Choper, the constitutional
scholars, wrote this about the two opinions: “[I]f Gideon only toppled ‘a bridge shaky
and ready to come down,’ Douglas may have dynamited some rather sturdy-looking
ones.”3 Professor Kamisar went on to predict “that twenty years from now, perhaps
sooner, Gideon, not Douglas, will be regarded as ‘the other’ right-to-counsel case
handed down on March 18, 1963.”4
History may have proved Professor Kamisar wrong on this point, but his prediction
and Lewis’s description lend fodder to an unexplored legal theory that has both
instrumental and intrinsic value in the press to establish a civil right to counsel. This
theory is “civil Douglas.”
1ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 186 (1964).
2Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
3Yale Kamisar & Jesse Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 1, 7 (1963).
4Yale Kamisar, Book Review, 78 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 478, 481 (1964) (reviewing Anthony Lewis’s Gideon’s Trumpet).
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In this article I argue that the civil
Douglas doctrinal path to a civil right to
counsel on appeal is (perhaps paradoxically) more direct than the civil Gideon
path to a civil right to counsel at trial.
This is because the path to civil Gideon
has to deal with the specter of Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services and its inexplicable “presumption” against a civil
right to counsel at trial when physical
liberty is not at stake.5 As a result, civil
Gideon advocates have had to argue that
the interests in their cases are equivalent
to the physical liberty interest at issue in
Gideon in order to gain traction under
Lassiter; even cases involving the most
important nonliberty interests, such as
the right to parent, have yielded inconsistent results under this approach.
In contrast to Lassiter and the other accessto-justice at-trial cases that largely turn on
the underlying substantive rights of the
petitioner, the access cases on appeal turn
instead on the procedural extent to which
due process and equal protection demand a
right to counsel.6 Thus, for example, the
Court in Ross v. Moffitt bound the right to
counsel on appeal in Douglas to first
appeals as of right, and not to subsequent
discretionary appeals.7 Moreover, access
cases on appeal contain no Lassiter-like
presumption. Therefore claims for civil
Douglas need not rely first on those difficult arguments that equate the underlying
rights of the petitioner to physical liberty
interests. A civil Douglas claim thus sidesteps Lassiter and provides a clearer path to
a civil right to counsel.
Once established, civil Douglas will be
intrinsically useful because indigent
appellants will have a categorical right to
counsel. But it will also be instrumentally valuable: In the same way that Douglas
presaged the downfall of Betts on that
fateful March day in 1963, civil Douglas

will mark the inexorable downfall of
Lassiter and will be yet one more step in
the direction of civil Gideon.
I offer one last introductory note. The
civil Gideon movement, of course, is
much more than a federal constitutional
litigation movement. My proposal
respects that. Thus I certainly do not
offer civil Douglas as a panacea. Instead
it is merely one additional step in the
direction of civil Gideon, and any litigation toward civil Douglas must occur
only within the larger context of a political movement. I pose my argument here
in terms of Supreme Court jurisprudence to support constitutional arguments under those many state constitutions that follow Supreme Court doctrine
in their own due process and equal protection clauses.
I.

Background: Civil Gideon
and Lassiter

The civil Gideon movement at every turn
has had to deal with the scourge of
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services.
The Court in Lassiter applied the familiar
three-part, Fourteenth Amendment due
process test of Mathews v. Eldridge and
held that civil litigants were entitled to a
right to counsel only when the factors in
the Mathews test overcame a presumption against a right to counsel in cases
where physical liberty is not at stake.8
The facts of Lassiter, a state-initiated termination-of-parental-rights case, presented a strong argument for a categorical civil right to counsel under Mathews
because the civil defendant’s interest
(her parental rights) was quite high, the
government’s primary interest (the
well-being of the child) overlapped with
the defendant’s interest, and the risk of
an erroneous termination was demonstrably high.9 Nevertheless, the Court in

5Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 26–27 (1981) (Clearinghouse No. 29,118).
6The terms “access-to-justice cases” and “access cases” are used interchangeably to refer to cases in which access to
judicial processes depends upon a right to counsel.
7Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
8Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31–32. Of course, by the time Lassiter came down, the categorical right to counsel was well established in cases where physical liberty was at stake. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that states
must provide trial counsel to poor defendants faced with incarceration).
9Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.
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Lassiter held that the petitioner had no
right to counsel and that civil petitioners
had no categorical right to counsel.10

in the cooler is a greater deprivation of liberty than a parent’s permanent loss of
rights in a child.”12

Since Lassiter, civil Gideon advocates
have been seeking to persuade courts of
all stripes that the Mathews factors in the
advocates’ unique cases line up to overcome the presumption against the right
to counsel.11 Thus advocates seek to
demonstrate a heightened interest on
the part of the litigant and ultimately to
equate the litigant’s interest with physical liberty. They attempt to show that the
government’s interest is merely pecuniary, or that it aligns perfectly with the
litigant’s interest so that it does not
affect the balance. They also try to show
that the factors in their cases—such as
the factual and legal complexities, the
talent and skill of the opponent, and the
handicap of the litigant—result in a singularly high risk of erroneous deprivation of a fundamental right.

This strategy has yielded some success.
The Mathews factors in certain individual cases—most frequently parental
rights cases—overcome the Lassiter presumption against a constitutional right
to counsel when physical liberty is not at
stake, several states and at least one federal court have ruled.13 The balance of
the Mathews factors (or something like
them) results in a state constitutional
right to counsel in entire classes of cases,
some state courts have even ruled.14
But, notwithstanding its successes, this
strategy of aligning underlying rights
and focusing on interests under Lassiter
has predictably yielded a spotty, patchwork landscape similar to the case-bycase landscape of the criminal right to
counsel under Gideon’s precursor, Betts v.
Brady.15 This strategy then has been only
partially successful in achieving a full
civil right to counsel, a civil Gideon.

In this vein, advocates pay particular attention to the petitioner’s interests and
repeatedly attempt to align them with the
physical liberty interests in Gideon in order
to overcome the Lassiter presumption.
Parents’ rights, because of their constitutional significance, have formed the basis
of most of these claims. As if foretelling
this strategy, Douglas J. Besharov wrote in a
now-famous comment in the immediate
aftermath of the Lassiter decision, “Lassiter,
for all practical purposes, stands for the
proposition that a drunken driver’s night

II. Sidestepping Lassiter:
Civil Douglas

One way to avoid the necessary alignment of interests under Lassiter and its
presumption is to avoid that case altogether: to sidestep it. One way to do this
is to focus on a civil right to counsel on
appeal, or civil Douglas. A good starting
point is the case of M.L.B. v. S.L.J., the
1996 Supreme Court case that provided

10Id. at 31–33 (holding that the Constitution does not require appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding).
11See., e.g., In re Adoption of K.L.P., 735 N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (“[The parent] maintains that due process
principles as set forth in Lassiter … required the trial court to appoint her counsel under the facts of the present case.”);
see also cases cited infra notes 13 and 14.
12Douglas J. Besharov, Terminating Parental Rights: The Indigent Parent’s Right to Counsel After Lassiter v. North Carolina,
15 FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY 205, 221 (1981).
13 See, e.g., In re Powers, 624 N.W.2d 472, 477–78 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (“The constitutional concepts of due process
and equal protection also grant respondents in termination proceedings the right to counsel”); State ex rel. T.H. v. Min,
802 S.W.2d 625, 626–27 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the balance of Lassiter factors weigh in favor of right to
counsel in a state-initiated custody hearing); Garramone v. Romo, 94 F.3d 1446, 1449–50 (10th Cir. 1996) (“After balancing all the [Lassiter] factors, we conclude that, under the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process, [the petitioner] had a right to counsel at the [custody and neglect proceedings].”).
14See, e.g., K.P.B. v. D.C.A., 685 So. 2d. 750, 752 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (holding that Alabama constitutional due process
requires appointment of counsel for indigents in termination of parental rights cases); Matter of K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 286
(Alaska 1991) (holding that Alaska constitutional due process requires appointment of counsel for indigents in termination of parental rights cases); In re Jay R., 197 Cal. Rptr. 672, 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that California constitutional due process requires appointment of counsel for indigents in certain nonconsensual stepparent adoptions).
15Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (holding that the courts should determine right to trial counsel in criminal cases on
a case-by-case basis).
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so much fodder for civil Gideon instigators.16 A state may not, consistent with
equal protection and due process, condition an appeal of a trial court decree
terminating parental rights on the parent’s ability to pay record-preparation
fees, M.L.B. held.17 The Court applied a
conglomerated Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection/due process approach:

the petitioner’s interest in parental
rights in M.L.B. with the defendant’s
interest in the collateral effects of a conviction in Mayer; the Court aligned the
risk of error in each case and aligned the
government’s financial interest in each
case.20 Just as in Mayer, then, the Court
in M.L.B. ruled that the appellate fee was
unconstitutional.21

We observe first that the Court’s
decisions concerning access to
judicial processes, commencing
with Griffin and running through
Mayer, reflect both equal protection and due process concerns.…
[I]n the Court’s Griffin-line of
cases, “[d]ue process and equal
protection principles converge.”
The equal protection concern
relates to the legitimacy of fencing
out would-be appellants based
solely on their inability to pay core
costs.… The due process concern
homes in on the essential fairness
of the state-ordered proceedings
anterior to adverse state action. A
“precise rationale” has not been
composed … because cases of this
order “cannot be resolved by
resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis.”18

The Court in M.L.B. drew upon its conglomerated doctrine and freely compared
access cases at both the trial level and the
appellate level, seemingly conflating its
access jurisprudence across due process
and equal protection and across trial and
appeal.22 Notwithstanding its conflation
and the resulting lack of a “precise rationale,” a careful reading of these access cases
cited in M.L.B. reveals two distinct trends
in the Court’s access jurisprudence.23
First, the Court privileges questions of
substantive rights over procedure in the
cases involving access to trial. Second, and
in contrast to its approach at trial, the Court
privileges questions of procedure over
substantive rights in the cases involving
access to appeal. Taken together, these
trends suggest that the doctrinal path to
civil right to counsel on appeal is clearer
and more direct than the path to civil right
to counsel at trial.

In application, this approach amounted
to a kind of doctrinal mapping exercise:
The Court mapped out the cases in its
access-to-justice jurisprudence and,
through careful comparisons, located
the M.L.B. case on that doctrinal map.
The result was a comparison between
M.L.B. and Mayer v. Chicago, a case which
barred states from conditioning an
appeal of a conviction for a petty offense
(which involved no physical liberty
interest) on the defendant’s ability to
pay a transcript fee.19 The Court aligned

A. Access at Trial:
Substantively Bound

The Court’s decisions related to access to
trial courts are keenly attuned to the
petitioner’s interests and to alternative
avenues of relief. When a petitioner’s
interests are high, the Court ensures
equal access and overturns barriers;
when interests are lower, the Court
upholds barriers to access. The fee cases
are excellent examples of this trend. In
Boddie v. Connecticut the Court, relying

16M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (Clearinghouse No. 52,214).
17Id. at 123.
18Id. at 120 (citations omitted).
19Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
20M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 121–23.
21Id. at 128.
22Id. at 110–21.
23Id. at 120.
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on fundamental associational rights
(i.e., the rights to marry and, presumably, to divorce) and the divorce court’s
monopoly power over divorce in the
state, overturned the imposition of court
fees in a divorce case.24 Similarly, in
Little v. Streater, the Court, relying on
fundamental parental rights, liberty
rights, and pecuniary interests, overturned the imposition of costs for blood
tests in a paternity case.25
In contrast, in United States v. Kras, the
Court upheld fees required to secure a
discharge in bankruptcy.26 In Ortwein v.
Schwab the Court upheld court fees
required to challenge an agency determination reducing petitioner’s welfare
benefits.27 The Court held in these cases
that the interests—discharge in bankruptcy and welfare benefits—were low
and that petitioners had other nonjudicial redress for their underlying problems. The Court therefore upheld the
barriers in those cases.
The counsel cases at trial also illustrate
this trend of a focus on interests. In
Gideon v. Wainwright the Court held that
an indigent criminal defendant was
entitled to counsel when his physical
liberty was at stake.28 The Court extended this principle somewhat in Alabama v.
Shelton, holding that a petitioner was
entitled to counsel when his suspended
sentence could end up in actual deprivation of his physical liberty.29 But in Scott
v. Illinois and Gagnon v. Scarpelli the
Court made clear that a petitioner was
entitled to counsel at trial only when the

proceeding would result in an actual
deprivation of physical liberty.30 Thus
the Lassiter Court drew the line at physical liberty and ruled that an indigent
civil petitioner whose physical liberty
was not at stake would have to overcome
a presumption against counsel in order
to receive counsel at trial. These cases
illustrate the trend at trial: when determining access rights, including the right
to counsel, the Court’s decisions turn on
the underlying substantive rights.
B. Access on Appeal:
Procedurally Bound

In contrast, the Court’s decisions related
to access on appeal turn on the procedural extent to which due process and
equal protection demand equal access.
The fee cases again illustrate this trend
most saliently. The leading case here is
Griffin v. Illinois, in which the Court overturned a requirement that criminal
defendants purchase a trial transcript as
a condition of appeal.31 The defendant
in that case was incarcerated for his
alleged crime, but the Court applied this
same principle to cases involving nonliberty interests. For example, in Mayer
v. Chicago, the Court overturned a similar
transcript requirement in a criminal
case that involved, for the defendant,
serious collateral consequences but no
jail time.32 Similarly, in Lindsey v.
Normet, the Court overturned a doublebond requirement for appellants seeking to appeal an eviction—a housing
interest.33 Most recently, in M.L.B. v.
S.L.J., the Court overturned a record-

24Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (Clearinghouse No.1692).
25Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
26United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (Clearinghouse No. 6537).
27Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (Clearinghouse No. 7694).
28Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335.
29Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (Clearinghouse No. 8245)
(holding that the right to counsel extends even to petty criminal cases where the defendant’s physical liberty is at stake).
30Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (Clearinghouse No. 25,297); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)
(Clearinghouse No. 4320).
31Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
32Mayer, 404 U.S. at 189.
33Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (Clearinghouse No. 2802).
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preparation fee required for appeal of a
private termination-of-parental-rights
proceeding—a parental rights interest.34 The defining characteristic of
these cases is the right of access to appeal
almost irrespective of the underlying
right. With the very strong equal protection influence, the Court in these cases
sees equal access to appeal itself as a
powerful interest—clearly an interest
that cannot be conditional on one’s ability to pay.
The counsel cases on appeal, too, stand
for the proposition that the Court privileges questions of process over substantive rights in access cases on appeal. For
example, the Court in Ross and Evitts v.
Lucey limited the right to counsel in
Douglas to the petitioner’s first appeal as
of right.35 Thus, following the reasoning
in Ross, the Court in Pennsylvania v. Finley
refused to extend Douglas to postconviction proceedings.36 Most recently the
Court in Halpert v. Michigan held that a
defendant could not have waived his right
to counsel on his first appeal by virtue of
his nolo contendere plea at trial.37
The hallmark of these cases is a definition of the scope of right to counsel on
appeal based on process first—appeals as
of right versus discretionary appeals. As
a matter of fact, the petitioner in each of
these cases was incarcerated, but the
decisions themselves rest on the
process, not the liberty interests at
stake. None of these cases contains any
of the careful parsing of underlying
interests that are the mainstay of the
Court’s opinions on counsel at trial. This
is most notably absent in Halpert, where
the petitioner’s liberty interest seems
the most tenuous of the bunch.38 Taken
together with the Court’s jurisprudence

on appellate fees, the trend is clear: the
appellate access decisions turn first on
process, not the underlying substantive
rights. Thus, by focusing on counsel on
appeal, the path to a civil right to counsel
may be clearer.
III. Conclusion

Because the Court’s jurisprudence on
access to appeal turns first on process,
not substantive rights, arguments for
civil right to counsel on appeal need not
focus first on aligning the underlying
substantive rights with the right to physical liberty, or otherwise to focus on the
interests under the Matthews test, in
order to satisfy the singular demands of
Lassiter. Instead arguments for civil right
to counsel on appeal may sidestep
Lassiter by focusing on process—the first
appeal as of right, pursuant to Douglas.
Nonetheless, advocates should be cognizant that all of the Court’s access-toappeal cases, which include fee cases and
counsel cases, involve weighty interests.
Even if the cases do not turn on those
interests, they are there. So perhaps the
best case to achieve civil right to counsel
on appeal is one that involves the most
important interest short of physical liberty: parental rights.
An appropriate termination-of-parentalrights case on appeal could be the vehicle
for civil Douglas, a more direct path to a
civil right to counsel. And once established, just as Douglas presaged the fall of
Betts thirty-three years ago, civil Douglas,
as one of several litigation strategies all in
the context of a broader political movement, could help foreshadow the fall of
Lassiter.

34M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 102.
35Ross, 417 U.S. at 600 (1974); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
36Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
37Halpert v. Michigan, 125 S. Ct. 2582 (2005).
38Id. (holding that an indigent criminal defendant was entitled, pursuant to the due process and equal protection clauses, to
appointed counsel on appeal of a conviction on a voluntary plea of nolo contendere, not an involuntary guilty verdict).
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